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Power, norms and theory. A meta-political inquiry
Tim Heysse*
Research in Political Philosophy Leuven (RIPPLE), Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven,
Leuven, Belgium
Realism criticizes the idea, central to what may be called ‘the priority
view’, that philosophy has the task of imposing from the outside general
norms of morality or standards of reasonableness on politics understood as
the domain of power. According to realism, political philosophy must
reveal the speciﬁc standards internal to the political practice of handling
power appropriately and as it develops in actual circumstances. Framed in
those terms, the debate evokes the idea that political power itself is lacking
normativity until such time as norms are devised that govern its use. In
contrast, this essay identiﬁes a normative dimension internal to (the con-
quest and exercise of) power. Power depends on recognition and support
in the form of belief. This dependence explains how an interest in power
introduces a responsiveness to normative considerations into the domain of
politics.
Keywords: political normativity; realism; violence; belief; reasonableness;
truth; time
There is mounting criticism of a certain conception of the very undertaking of
philosophy that underlies much work in contemporary political philosophy.
Following such critics as Bernard Williams, Raymond Geuss or Glen Newey, I
label this conception the ‘priority view’. The priority view, explicitly or implic-
itly, represents the idea that philosophy ought to create ‘the framework within
which the political is played out’, (Newey 2001, p. 37, cf. 35, Galston 2010,
pp. 386–390). Philosophy must discover, in other words, general norms of rea-
sonableness or morality and then apply these to politics understood as the ter-
rain where people ﬁght for the opportunity to exercise power. To this
conception of political philosophy’s role, it is often objected that politics must
not be reduced to the domain of power. Politics is a practice deﬁned by rules
and standards speciﬁc to the proper or desirable conquest and use of power,
and a distinctive kind of goods (such as protection from violence). Norms or
values need not be imported ‘into’ politics. Politics, correctly understood,
includes all the norms and values that we can realistically expect to be effec-
tive in social reality (Philp 2007, p. 52). For highlighting the reality of politics,
many critics of the priority view are known as ‘realists’.1
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This essay does not offer arguments for or against either side of this debate
(which will be described in a little more detail in the following section).
Rather, it points to a dimension of politics that risks being overlooked both by
the priority view and its realist opponents. Their debate turns on the nature or
status of the norms and values determining how we should conquer and exer-
cise political power. As such, it suggest that conquering and exercising power
is, prescinding from instrumental or strategic rationality and the contributions
of philosophy, devoid of normativity.2 This essay aims to contest this sugges-
tion by exploring a normative dimension internal to the appropriation of
power. In this sense, this essay is a contribution to the perennial debate on the
relationship between philosophy as the voice of reason or morality and politics
as the realm of power. Yet, it also aims to contribute to a long-overdue inquiry
into the terms we employ in thinking about politics. It is therefore not only of
concern to philosophers.
One obvious factor is that the very terms ‘politics’ and ‘political’ are used
in different ways by philosophers. John Rawls has given wide currency to a
speciﬁc sense of ‘political’. ‘Political’ (as opposed to ‘comprehensive’) princi-
ples establish a stable and morally acceptable basis for social union and deﬁne
an exercise of political power that is ‘proper and hence justiﬁable’ (Rawls
1996, p. 217). Simultaneously, however, Rawls uses the word in a connected
yet broader sense to identify a particular relationship between people. The
‘political’ relation involves people (1) who together constitute a society in
which they lead a complete live and (2) exercise coercive power over one
another backed by the government’s use of force.
As Rawls notes, ‘in a constitutional regime the special feature of the politi-
cal relation is that political power is ultimately the power of […] free and
equal citizens as a collective body’ (Rawls 1996, p. 217). His project is to clar-
ify this special feature required by democracy, and the moral values of freedom
and equality. Certainly, no contemporary realist rejects democracy or such val-
ues as freedom and equality (Sleat 2013, p. 3). Nevertheless many realists dis-
tance themselves from Rawls as the prime example of the priority view. The
reason is that they seek, in contrast to Rawls (on their interpretation), an under-
standing of democracy, freedom, equality or any other (ethically) desirable fea-
ture of the political relation that is ‘internal’, i.e. ‘extracted’ from the political
relation itself (Hall in press, pp. 3–4, cf. Rossi 2012, p. 157, Jubb and Rossi
2015, forthcoming, Rossi and Sleat 2014, sec. 2.1).
This essay is sympathetic to realism, if only for its endeavour to draw
attention to the political relation. Nevertheless, its aim differs from that of both
the priority view and realism. I do not so much look for ways of going beyond
the very notion of power in order to ﬁnd (internal or external) norms or values
to make that relation more justiﬁable in the sense of more just, moral,
desirable, less bad, etc. Rather, I want to concentrate on the nature of the
political relation itself. To understand the political relation is to see the
normative dimension introduced by the very fact that it is the relation between
2 T. Heysse
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
U 
Le
uv
en
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
], 
[T
IM
 H
EY
SS
E]
 at
 13
:40
 23
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
people wielding political power over one another. My purpose is elucidatory
or ‘hermeneutic’ rather than prescriptive.
For this purpose, a rough characterization of the political relation in the
two dimensions indicated by Rawls sufﬁces. (1) A ‘political’ relation involves
people exerting power over one another. ‘Power’ is understood here in the
restricted sense of power to coerce, to obtain actions through the use (or the
threat) of sanctions, particularly physical violence. (2) But not all power is
political. Politics establishes the terms of social unity. It is ‘the art of uniﬁca-
tion’ that joins people into a community to a sufﬁcient extent for the question
what is to be done in society to make sense and to require some answer
(Walzer 1967, 194); (Galston 2010, p. 390). An issue (about media ethics, say)
becomes ‘political’, when it becomes a potential object of collective decision-
making (of law or policy). In a ﬁrst formulation, my purpose therefore is to
explore the normativity implied by the very relation that is instantiated when
‘political agents’ have (coercive) power over ‘subjects’ as a consequence of
the formation and execution of collective decisions in society.
A further complication arises because the meaning of ‘normativity’ is also
controversial. In order to sidestep controversy, let us grant that a normative
approach presupposes two things. First, it requires that, when comparing situa-
tions or actions (including those that are possible, envisaged, etc.), we do not
merely observe differences: some cases are judged deﬁcient, cf. (Korsgaard
2009, p. 34). It is characteristic of a normative account that it yields a special
class of comparative judgements that I will call ‘corrective remarks’. These
corrective remarks, in turn, characterize performances as falling short of a
model, a standard or violating a rule or a norm.3 (In the two following sec-
tions, we only consider corrective remarks with respect to actions).
Second, a truly normative account also explains why the relevant corrective
remarks matter. Corrective remarks are reason-giving statements or corrective
reason statements, explaining why the agent should (or why it is good for the
agent to) alter her behaviour or performance (Finlay 2010, 2012). Normativity
is not wholly contingent on the agent’s judgements or attitudes. So a complete
account of normativity explains in what sense it is non-arbitrary or non-
optional, and why it yields true corrective statements an agent cannot ignore or
reject (Copp 2005, 195). A theory of instrumental rationality, for instance,
points out that disregarding certain corrective remarks about the options chosen
decreases the probability of realizing one’s preferences. (In what follows, the
terms ‘corrective remarks’ and ‘corrective reason-statements’ are used
interchangeably).
Section 1 details the debate between the priority view and realism, and
clariﬁes the different senses in which we can say that normativity is introduced
into the political relation ‘from the outside’. Spelling out the metaphor of
‘internal’ vs. ‘external’ forms of political normativity helps to state the thesis
of this essay more precisely. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize the political relation
and explain how coercive power depends on belief. Because of this
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 3
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dependence, political agents cannot be completely indifferent to normative
considerations. An analysis of legitimacy is beyond the scope of this essay.
However, I will brieﬂy indicate in the concluding Section 4 how a ‘power-
based form’ of normativity connects to an interpretation of legitimacy that
avoids the priority view without collapsing legitimacy into mere agreement
with those in power. (For the purposes of this essay, ‘legitimacy’ should be
understood as political legitimacy, i.e. the entitlement to coercive power). As
will become apparent, understanding this form of political normativity
demands bringing certain temporal considerations to the fore.
1. Realism vs. the priority view
Space precludes the possibility of discussing the various positions for and
against the priority view.4 Nevertheless, it is useful to itemize the fundamental
traits of both the priority view and realism. This also serves to give a precise
meaning to the claim, argued for in the following sections, that there is a form
of normativity internal to power itself that is overlooked both by the priority
view and its realist critics.
The priority view consists of four fundamental ideas:
(1) The starting point is a conception of practical reason. ‘A philosophical
model […] purporting to explain the phenomena [… is] taken to […]
be the basis for an essentially normative account of how ideally
rational political agents would act’ (Newey 2001, p. 132, cf. Mouffe
2005, pp. 83–86, Geuss 2005a, p. 1, Galston 2010, p. 390).
(2) There is an epistemological understanding of (moral or political) the-
ory: the conception of practical reason takes the form of a theory
justifying an explicit set of rules that tell us how to reach reasonable
agreement or a list of criteria that identify reasonable solutions that
would settle an issue. The epistemological theory singles out the (most)
reasonable solution or a (restricted) family of reasonable resolutions.
Remaining disagreements are merely verbal or temporal (Compare
Rorty 1979, 319). Often the principles of practical reason are arguably
implicit in actual social and political practice. The social origin of these
principles notwithstanding, it is philosophical theory, rationally
(re)constructing actual practice in reﬂective equilibrium or through tran-
scendental analysis that justiﬁes them as reasonable and ultimately
determines political reasonableness.
(3) Most realists focus on moralist versions of the priority view restricting
practical reasonableness to morality and entailing the priority of moral
philosophy. For purposes of this essay, however, the content of practi-
cal reason is secondary. It is the claim of the epistemological theory to
determine what an ideally reasonable agent would do or think that is
crucial. For this claim results in a particular view of coercive power
4 T. Heysse
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and legitimacy; the legitimacy of an exercise of power requires that we
are able to show its reasonable acceptability in advance and on the
basis of independent criteria validated by the epistemological theory.
Even if some speciﬁc decisions are not sanctioned by theory but result
from existing power relations (through bargaining and compromise, for
instance), such ‘autonomous’ use of power is reasonable and legitimate
to the extent that it remains within limits validated by the criteria of
reasonableness.
(4) The priority view has a remarkable temporal dimension. Norms of rea-
sonableness are to direct political decisions and/or the exercise of
power (Galston 2010, pp. 386–390). So the norms and the theory vali-
dating them must precede the decisions and the exercise of power;
‘philosophy operates prior to politics’ (Newey 2001, pp. 7–8, 31, 50,
51–52), providing a theoretically validated framework within which
politics has to run its course (determining when compromise or bar-
gaining are acceptable, for instance). Even if speciﬁc decisions are left
to the discretion of the citizens, theory forwards rules for the decision-
making process or standards for the assessment of outcomes prior to
politics.
One consequence of the priority view is a rather static conception of reason-
able politics. All the major elements of political philosophy – the criteria for
reasonable acceptability, any outline of a basic structure for society or catalogue
of basic rights – are supposedly entailed by the truth of the epistemological
theory. But truth is a stable property (of propositions or theories) that cannot be
lost (Wright 1995, pp. 215–216), implying that any reasonable politics derived
from a true theory is essentially unchanging. I will return to the temporal
aspects of the priority view in the last section.
Our immediate concern, however, is the general understanding of normativ-
ity implied by the priority view. It is unquestionably political in form. The
conception of practical reason yields corrective remarks that criticize actual cir-
cumstances or behaviour in society and show how to rectify them. The
epistemological theory, moreover, purportedly demonstrates that there are no
good reasons for disregarding these remarks. The priority view therefore pre-
sents a normative interpretation of social union as arising from a consensus
that is ‘reasonable’ as explained by the epistemological theory.
However, it is precisely this understanding of one dimension of the politi-
cal relation that undermines the priority view’s ability to tell us anything of
consequence about the other dimension. The vision of political union on terms
proven to be reasonably acceptable to all citizens, realists allege, underplays
the ‘uncontroversial, empirical’ fact that ‘politics is characterised by endemic
disagreement’, (Newey 2001, pp. 7–8, 31, 50, 51–52, (Galston 2010, pp. 396–
397, Hall 2013, p. 8–10). As a result, the priority view has no fundamental
need for coercive power to impose decisions against opposition or at least it
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5
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conﬁnes its legitimate exercise to the domain deﬁned by reasonably agreeable
principles (Newey 2001, pp. 7–8, 31, 50, 51–52, Geuss 2005a, p. 1, Sleat
2013, chap. 1, Rossi and Sleat 2014, sec. 2.1 and 2.2). Dismissing disagree-
ment, conﬂict and the use of power as theoretically insigniﬁcant or temporary
effects of unreasonableness (or relegating it to non-ideal theory) arguably
represents a ‘desire to evade, displace, or escape from politics’, (Newey 2001,
pp. 2–3, 7–8, 28, 56, Geuss 2005a, p. 1, Philp 2007, 60–61). Not surprisingly,
the priority view has been criticized for presenting utterly unfeasible political
ideals and lacking practical import (Philp 2007, 59, Bellamy 2010, Rossi 2010,
506–507, Erman and Möller in press, 4).
There is therefore a non-metaphorical sense in which the priority view
expects philosophy to impose from the outside the aims to be achieved or the
norms to be respected by politics, as the sphere of conﬂict and coercive power.
For the priority view relies solely on the epistemological theory to provide
principles that are reasonably agreeable to all and cannot, in principle, see any
need for coercion to impose them.
Most versions of realism reject this idea that political philosophy can take
coercion to be in principle redundant. Nevertheless, they do not abandon the
project of a normative account of politics altogether but offer, for example,
interesting theories of political value, virtue or legitimacy (Philp 2010, 471–
475).5 The speciﬁcally political nature of these accounts lies in the fact that,
rather than idealizing conﬂict and power away, they try to respond to the
harms, evils and suffering that so often ﬂow from conﬂict and the use of coer-
cive power in imposing social unity. In addition, they explicitly make allow-
ance for ‘the impact’ that the realities of power itself has ‘on the development
and realization of values and outcomes’ (Philp 2007, p. 3).
In particular, one starting point for an ‘internal’ normative account as pro-
posed by some realists are two unquestionable convictions: (1) There is a dif-
ference between power and violence or between political rule and domination
(understood as rule by threat of violence), see e.g. (Philp 2007, chap. 3, Sleat
2013, p. 60). And (2) a crucial ‘good’ of politics is to limit violence as much
as possible, see e.g. (Mouffe 2005, pp. 101–102). (This in turn may require
legitimacy, since perhaps only a legitimate order guarantees lasting security.)
For instance, Bernard Williams, one of the ﬁrst and most inﬂuential realists,
saw the problem of the reduction of violence and terror as ‘the ﬁrst question
of politics’6:
The situation of one lot of people terrorizing another lot of people is not per se a
political situation: it is, rather, the situation which the existence of the political is
in the ﬁrst place supposed to alleviate (Williams 2005, p. 5).
In particular, a legitimate political order must solve the ﬁrst question of politics
without itself relying on terror and violence:
6 T. Heysse
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if the power of one lot of people over another is to represent a solution […]
something has to be said to explain [this and this explanation] cannot simply be
an account of successful domination. It has to be something in the mode of
justifying explanation or legitimation. (Williams 2005, p. 5, cf. Philp 2007, p. 73,
Hall 2013, pp. 6–7, Jubb and Rossi 2015, forthcoming)
This ‘Basic Legitimation Demand’ is clearly a normative principle, or at least
a principle introducing the very idea of normativity; it is the ‘axiom that might
does not imply right, that power does itself not justify’ (Ibid).
As announced, I do not want to intervene in the debate between the priority
view and realists such as Williams nor take a stand on the nature of appropri-
ately political norms or values. Rather my aim is to understand the political
relation itself. For this purpose, I will in the next section adopt two insights
from Williams but also depart in a crucial way from his position. I will elabo-
rate on the distinction between violence and power underlying the ‘ﬁrst political
question’, and on the connections between power and justifying explanation as
highlighted by the Basic Legitimation Demand. Regrettably, two aspects of
Williams’ account obscure the real import of the second point. First, Williams
seems uncertain about whether the Basic Legitimation Demand is to some
extent a moral principle.7 Second, Williams understands the connection between
power and justiﬁcation in terms of legitimacy8 (in terms, moreover, of the
singular issue of the legitimacy of non-liberal regimes). In contrast, the follow-
ing section will show that the connection between power and justiﬁcation is
crucial not in the ﬁrst place to legitimacy but to the very existence of political
power; independently of issues of morality or legitimacy, power itself needs
words of justiﬁcation. I will return to legitimacy brieﬂy in the last section.
Likewise, there is no denying that reducing violence and conﬂict is of
prime moral or ethical importance. Nevertheless, in the next section I will also
argue that the distinction between violence and power constitutes a fact about
politics. It is this fact that by itself, independently of its undeniable moral or
ethical signiﬁcance, makes it unadvisable for a political agent, however
morally insensitive, to ignore certain corrective remarks.
I take Williams as illustrative in a general way of many realist approaches
to politics. This suggests a sense in which realism remains external to the
political relation. To be sure, in so far as realists avoid the claim that their
theories are acceptable to anyone reﬂecting reasonably on our political
condition and in so far as they recognize that the content of even political
legitimacy, value and virtue is controversial, realism cannot be seen as external
in the same sense as the priority view. There is no presumption of consensus;
realism is conscious of the decisive role of the law and institutions in enforcing
a particular interpretation of legitimacy or virtuous political conduct (Philp
2012, pp. 17–18, Sleat 2013, pp. 12–14).
Yet realism is external to the political relation in the sense that it does not
explain why its fundamental notions, such as the distinction between violence
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7
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and power or the connection between power and justiﬁcation, matter for
someone interested in power.9 This is not to deny the importance of realist
normative accounts nor their properly political nature. But granted that ‘politi-
cal theorists have […] to argue about the ideas and values that politicians
ought to draw on in responding to the world’ (Philp 2007, pp. 87–93, Philp
2010, p. 482), there is a prior question: in what sense is politics, as the domain
in which political power is wielded, hospitable to normative standards at all?
Answering this question requires an understanding of what is distinctive about
political power,10 which in turn implies an analysis of the political relation as
a relation of power, a discussion I reserve for the next section. This will
require that I give some indications of how power and violence are distinct
(irrespective of the moral signiﬁcance of this distinction).
In analysing the relation between people exercising power over another, I
will make recourse to two somewhat artiﬁcial assumptions. First, I will put the
many concerns that political agents undoubtedly have to one side and consider
them merely as political agents interested in exercising power for as long as
possible. Second, I will assume a strict division between political agents inter-
ested in power and those who are subjected to it. We will present ‘political
agents’ and ‘subjects’ as two distinct groups, ignoring the myriad of interde-
pendencies which power creates in any given society. To be sure, we hope for
virtuous politicians concerned about other things than merely perpetuating their
own power and we design institutions in order to balance their ambitions for
power. But, again, these concerns and institutions are not the issue here. The
aim is to understand the political relation and the extent to which it is respon-
sive to normative considerations. For this purpose, my artiﬁcial and somewhat
bleak picture of the political relation is of some use.
Accordingly, the following sections will answer two questions. (1) Does
the description of a political agent as solely concerned with coercive power
make it true that she cannot ignore or dismiss (a) certain (class of) corrective
reason-giving assertions explaining why she should act in a certain way? Are
there corrective statements that an agent cannot put to one side except by
rejecting a description of herself as a political agent interested in power? (2)
And, of course, what does it mean that she ‘cannot’?
2. Power and recognition
Certain facts about coercive power, as it has been understood by authors from
diverse philosophical and political backgrounds such as Niccolò Machiavelli,
Hannah Arendt, Claude Lefort and John Searle, are responsible for establishing
a form of normativity internal to power itself. And it is this normative dimen-
sion which I intend to further analyse in Sections 2 and 3. In this section, the
word ‘violence’ is used in its primary sense of physical assault; later on we
will consider more subtle forms of ‘structural’ violence as well.
8 T. Heysse
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It is convenient to use the elegant ‘formal analysis’ by Searle. On that
analysis, power arises out of what he calls the construction of social reality
(Searle 2010, p. 201). Social facts are instituted by the collective creation of
status functions. The clearest case of this is the assignment of a status function
to an object or a person by virtue of a ‘status function declaration’. As a result,
that person or object is enabled to perform certain functions (Searle 1995,
pp. 39, 44, 46; Searle 2006, p. 17). For instance,
while a knife has a certain physical structure that enables it to cut, a piece of
paper in my hand, unlike the knife in my pocket, does indeed perform a function
of money, but […] not in virtue of its physical structure but in virtue of collective
attitudes.11
More abstractly, ‘the logical form’ of such status function declarations is:
(SD) We […] make it the case by Declaration that a status function Y exists in
context C, (Searle 2010, p. 201), the label (SD) is added.
By collectively recognizing status functions (by assigning the status of ‘money’
or the status of ‘political leader’), we create and then grant power. For we create
and accept certain rights, obligations, responsibilities, duties, entitlements,
authorizations, permissions, requirements (Searle 1995, pp. 39–40, Searle 2006,
p. 17).
Searle’s notion of ‘power’ is broader than coercive power. It is the power
to do something or to prevent someone else from doing something, cf.
(Morriss 1987). Accordingly, the propositional content of status-function
declarations creating power is partly that (S does A). So the recognition of the
status function creating power is of the form:
(PC) We collectively recognize (status function Y exists in C and because S has
relation R with Y (S has power (S does A))) (Searle, 1995, 104–105, Searle
2010, pp. 100–102), label added.
‘S’ can be replaced by an expression referring to a group or a single individual
and ‘A’ by the name of an action including such negatives as refraining.
With regard to our analysis of the political relation and its internal norma-
tivity, four applications or extensions of Searle’s analysis (as such not high-
lighted by him) are noteworthy:
First, Searle’s formal tools articulate a speciﬁc political use of violence and
power. Political violence differs not only in scale from interpersonal, face-to-face
violence (e.g. a mugger beating up a victim). Distinctive for political violence is
that the physical acts of violence cannot be perpetrated by those ultimately
responsible (even if they do personally commit violence). Violence must be dele-
gated to specialized personnel (we cannot ourselves clear the streets of protes-
ters, we send out the police). This indicates, as PC conveys, that in politics
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9
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‘power […] is the primary and predominant factor’ (Arendt 1970, p. 52) in the
sense that political violence is only at the disposal of those with power. In PC,
‘A’ may be instantiated by some act of violence (‘sends out the police’). The vio-
lent act is then introduced within the scope of the power operator ‘S has power’.
PC expresses the fact that, even though violence and coercion through the threat
of violence may be necessary, the specialists of violence, such as ‘police forces,
armies, and other forms of organized coercion are themselves systems of status
functions’ (Searle 2010, p. 201). What is more; in PC, the power operator is gov-
erned by a status function Y, and the relation R between Y and S that in their turn
ﬁgure within the scope of the recognition operator. The systems of status func-
tions specializing in violence and coercion cannot in turn be created by violence;
they depend on recognition (the armed forces accepting S as their commander).
In brief, Searle’s formulas articulate the relation between political power
and violence; in politics, power 1) is primary to violence and 2) derives from
acceptance, compare (Arendt 1970, p. 52). Coercive power and violence often
go together, it is true, but in politics power should not be understood as merely
arising out of the use of violence (‘Power grows out of the barrel of a gun’)
(Searle 2010, pp. 164–166). In this sense, the distinction between power and
violence, although a distinction with normative signiﬁcance, is not itself
normative; it follows from facts about social reality.12 Moreover, PC also
expresses that (coercive) power, however autonomous or absolute, eventually
languishes without recognition or acceptance.
The second thing to note, however, is that PC is silent about what moti-
vates recognition. People may create a republic or elect a president for any rea-
son whatsoever (for promoting their survival, their privileges, their interests,
their values or their moral convictions). Nor does PC clarify the relation
between the people granting power (the ‘we’ in the formula) and the people
subjected to that power. PC applies to one group granting the power to use
violence against another group for purely selﬁsh reasons.
PC tells us no more than these two facts: in order to be able to use political
violence an agent has to have power and he or she ultimately owes that power
to the recognition of some other people. There must be some groups in society
that, by virtue of their support, create the political agent’s power and whose
motives for doing so are other than fear of violence generated by this agent.
Searle’s formulas are therefore compatible with situations where legitimacy is
‘not in play’, where (clearly illegitimate) domination is established by violence
(a coup d’état). However, they highlight three points: (1) domination, even
though created through violence, requires status functions and therefore power
to endure and (2) status functions and power are brought into being by
recognition, even if it is recognition by small groups in society (the army or
the police, an elite, a revolutionary vanguard). What is more, (3) the
connection between power and a form of recognition that is not enforced by
violence suggests (but perhaps does not establish) that power increases with
the number of people giving their recognition (regardless of what motivates
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this recognition). Politics, in other words, may be simultaneously the art of
uniting people and of conquering power.
It follows, third, that we must expand our picture of the political relation
(without reducing its artiﬁciality). The artiﬁcially strict distinction between
those exercising power and those subjected to it might encourage us to think
of the political relation as dyadic. Our elaboration on SD and PC indicates that
the political relation takes at least three arguments: there are political agents
exercising power over subjects and the agents’ supporters whose recognition
creates the power. (The two last arguments may be instantiated by the same
people; in principle, that is what happens in a representative democracy.)
Taking these three points together, fourth, suggests an outline of how we
can think of the institution of social union in a way that does not ignore the
role of (coercive) power. What unites people politically and, consequently,
what ultimately institutes a political community need not be reasonable agree-
ment on the principles of social union, nor even general acceptance of the
legitimacy of the rulers; it may just be acceptance by certain groups in society.
Political unity is established, let us say, when a course for society (principles,
laws, policies) is enforced; this course either wins my support or is imposed
upon me without my consent if backed by sufﬁcient power (and perhaps by
violence dependent on power). But even in the second case, this power institut-
ing social unity rests on acceptance, even if it is the acceptance by others in
society that I do not share. Of course, most actual situations will be an
inextricable amalgam of both cases.
Searle’s analysis and its extensions point to a dimension of the political
relation that is undeniably normative. For it shows that there are corrective
statements that no political agent ambitious for power can ignore. These are
both of a general nature and of a speciﬁc nature that depends on the speciﬁc
support from which the agent derives her power.
The general remarks are constituted by Searle’s analysis and the conclu-
sions that we draw form it. A political agent cannot very well ignore corrective
remarks that remind her of the distinction between violence and power; she
cannot forget that the use of violence requires power and that power depends
on recognition and possibly increases with the number of people she can unite
in support behind her. Moreover, the necessity of that support for the preserva-
tion of her power implies that the political agent cannot (openly) disregard the
corrective remarks that inﬂuence that support. This is the ‘cannot’ of instru-
mental rationality.
However, the normativity internal to the political relation cannot be reduced
to instrumental rationality. For that relation is not limited to political agents and
subjects; even if we imagine political agents to be merely instrumentally
rational in trying to obtain power, they may ﬁnd it impossible to ignore correc-
tive remarks that – depending on the motives of their supporters (which may
include a concern for justice, for instance) – may well be of a moral or ethical
nature.13 Depending on the political circumstances (the convictions of certain
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political agents’ supporters), the ambition for power and the concerns
underlying ethical or moral accounts of politics may connect; political agents,
even though personally unconcerned about ethics, cannot be publicly believed
to be indifferent to political justice, legitimacy or virtue if such matters are of
concern to their supporters. Here, I submit, lies the anchorage point within the
political relation for such normative accounts; normative accounts can inﬂuence
political behaviour by inﬂuencing those whose support grants power.
The primacy of power over violence and its dependence on recognition
results in there being corrective remarks giving reasons to act in a certain way
that someone ambitious for power cannot ignore (not even in foro interno) and
others she cannot publicly set to one side and which may include moral or
ethical remarks.
The normativity that is indicated by the sensitivity for such remarks, is
itself independent of moral or ethical concerns. For Searle’s analysis and our
conclusions do not rely on moral or ethical considerations. The distinction
between violence and power is of crucial moral signiﬁcance but here does not
have a moral character. To repeat, a distinction may be morally crucial without
being exclusively based on moral factors nor having only moral relevance
(such as the distinction between my children and other children). In contrast to
Williams and following Searle, moreover, we see the dependence of power on
recognition not as a requirement for legitimacy but as a precondition for the
very existence of power. In any case, SD and PC do not impose conditions on
recognition. They only stipulate, through the primacy of power over violence,
that not all ‘support’ for those in power is acquiescence induced by violence
and terror. Recognition must not have characteristics (such as reasonableness)
that make it a plausible source of legitimacy.
The most important argument to deny that we are importing extraneous
(normative) considerations into the political relation is that our analysis speaks
to the actual motives of political agents. For it spells out the preconditions of
what political agents are by hypothesis exclusively interested in – the political
conditions of the use of power and violence. The primacy of power over vio-
lence and its dependence on recognition follows from the fact that political
violence must be organized and political power therefore cannot be obtained
by means of individual acts of violence (as may be the case with the school
bully’s power, for instance).
In that sense, the primacy of power and its dependence on recognition con-
stitute facts about the political relation. So their main warrant lies in their
explanatory virtue; some modiﬁcations in the power structure can only be made
sense of by acknowledging these facts of power. Exhilarating examples are rev-
olutionary situations in which the dictatorship suddenly breaks down and the
means of violence become useless, ‘[w]here commands are no longer obeyed
(the army and the police forces no longer prepared to use their weapons)’
(Arendt 1970, p. 52). As these claims express facts about our political condi-
tion, a philosophical or theoretical argument in favour of them is probably not
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possible. That does not mean, however, that they are mere assumptions; one
need only point to political events throughout history as a way of justifying
them.
What stands out, at the end of this section, are the signiﬁcant limitations
on political theory. Theoretical analysis does not decree what our reasons for
supporting political agents should be. Nothing is said about that support being
reasonable. The considerations inspiring political support can be silly. In other
words, ‘recognition’ has merely an attributional sense (recognizing as) here
and not a fact-reporting sense (recognizing that); I can (publicly) recognize
you as the rightful heir to the throne (because it serves my interests), while
(privately) recognizing that your claim is weak in law.14
To return to Williams’ ‘axiom’ that might is not right, this section does not
tell us where the distinction lies. Worse, power need not derive from a concern
about what is right. However, neither does the section reiterate the trivial fact
that people are able to distinguish between what they think is right and what
those in power are up to. It shows the political relevance of this distinction.
When support does derive from concerns about what is right (when rulers pro-
fess to be or to do right), political agents cannot publicly make light of correc-
tive remarks about how their actions measure up to what their supporters
believe is right.
3. Belief
Power is created and granted through the recognition of status function
declarations. This recognition may be inspired by various motives, by desires,
fears, interests, etc. However, belief appears to be central to all these various
kinds of thoughts, (Davidson 1984, pp. 156–157); in order to desire or to fear
you must believe a lot of things. Belief being central to the recognition of a
status function, power is dependent on support in opinion or belief. We cannot
understand the political relation without imputing certain beliefs to supporters
whose recognition creates political agents’ power. (‘Belief’ is here conceived
of sufﬁciently broadly to include moral or normative beliefs).
In this Section 1 will show how this further reﬁnes our picture of the politi-
cal relation and the normativity entailed by the quest for power. As used here
in a political context, the notion of belief retains its ordinary epistemic mean-
ing, but I will only assume the most platitudinous aspects of this folk-psycho-
logical notion of ‘belief’. Foremost among these is the fact that, as Williams
puts it, ‘beliefs aim at truth’ (where truth includes moral or normative truth).
Some beliefs are false, but there is ‘a conceptual link between a belief and its
truth’, (Williams 1973, p. 145, cf. 136, cf. Heysse 1998, pp. 418–422). That
is, it is impossible to believe that p, while consciously acknowledging that p is
not true. This wholly generic dimension of belief so affects the political rela-
tion that there may be additional corrective remarks that a political agent ﬁnds
impossible to ignore.
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The connection between power and belief aiming at truth may revive the
aspirations of theory in political philosophy. This may happen in two ways. In
an ambitious version, the priority view and, in particular, its epistemological
component would be resurrected as a theory of true belief. If the epistemologi-
cal theory were to establish standards not of practical reason but of truth
(including moral truth), it would determine what to believe in politics. Philoso-
phy could formulate corrective remarks that no believer aiming at truth could
ignore and so, once again, direct political action.
In a more modest variant, theory, now in the guise of a theory of
genuine belief, promises an answer to a possible complaint about the
conclusions of the previous section. The complaint is that to restrict
violence to physical assault is to over-simplify. Subtle, non-physical forms
of (structural) violence shape beliefs or affect the material conditions in
which beliefs are formed. We cannot rule out a priori that the recognition
of status functions is engineered. Recognition might be inspired by an
attitude that is produced in a way that precludes it from being a genuine
belief. In such cases, the complaint concludes, the distinction between power
and violence, the dependence of power on recognition and belief and there-
fore the whole account of a power-based normativity collapses.15 Faced with
this complaint, the idea of a ‘test’, of a theory stipulating conditions of
genuine belief is alluring. For even if such a theory would not tell us what
to believe, it would allow outside observers to identify situations where
what appears to be power supported by beliefs is actually a form of
structural violence inducing acquiescence by shaping ‘beliefs’, compare
(Sleat 2013, pp. 118–120).
An epistemological theory of true belief or a doxastic theory of genuine
belief would signiﬁcantly enlarge the scope of the normative dimension inter-
nal to the political relation. For the previous section had nothing to say about
what beliefs should motivate political support. Corrective remarks by ‘out-
siders’ who (1) are not involved in the relation and (2) who disagree with the
beliefs motivating our support, are immaterial. By contrast, a theory validating
criteria of true or genuine belief would prove the pertinence of the corrective
remarks it inspires.
I will not argue here against epistemological or doxastic theories of true or
genuine belief. Even if the history of epistemology warrants pessimism, I grant
that such theories are not impossible. However, Donald Davidson argues
famously that an alternative for such theories lies in an account of ‘of how to
relate truth to human interests (desires, beliefs, intentions)’ (Davidson 1990,
p. 280). I will extend Davidson’s suggestion to politics and examine the
normativity internal to power resulting from the fact that power presupposes
belief aiming at truth. Corrective remarks made by people external to the
political relation prove to be relevant, but not in the way envisaged by
epistemological or doxastic theories.
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In order to show this, it is sufﬁcient to elaborate platitudinously upon
Williams’ slogan that beliefs aim at truth. Three consequences follow from it,
for which I cannot argue here but which are hardly controversial.
(1) Involuntariness of belief: it is impossible to decide at will to believe. I
cannot know to have acquired a certain state of mind in a manner
unconnected to its truth and ‘then, in full consciousness regard this as
a belief of mine, i.e. something I take to be true’ (Williams 1973,
p. 148). Accordingly, there is no sense in trying to force or bribe me
into believing something. Of course, I sometimes acquire beliefs in
ways unrelated to their truth (hypnotism, drugs, propaganda) but the
causal history of such beliefs must be hidden from me (propaganda
cannot admit to being propaganda; it must claim to be the truth), cf.
(McMyler 2011).
(2) Vulnerability of belief: we cannot consciously acknowledge not having
good reasons for our beliefs. People do not always have (good) reasons
for their beliefs, but if they have reasons for (changing) their beliefs
they must think that those reasons justify the beliefs. When confronted
with objections to a belief p or to the reasons used to justify p, that we
judge, by our current standards, to be convincing, we must reasonably
give it up. Such objections or corrective remarks explaining why we,
given that we want to believe what is true, should give up a belief,
may always be forthcoming. Beliefs are only held provisionally,
(Heysse 1998, pp. 419–420).
(3) Universality of the source of convincing objections: in the absence of
an epistemological theory that proves certain beliefs to be reasonably
acceptable to all, we have no basis to expect universal consent with
our beliefs. Yet, there is a universal dimension to the normativity of
belief. For convincing objections may be voiced by anyone; a foolish
or ignorant person may speak words of wisdom. Even when we deem
a person’s judgement unﬁt or when circumstances (making evidence
unavailable) render it unﬁt and we therefore do not expect or seek her
agreement, she may (perhaps unwittingly) formulate objections that are
considered sound by ourselves or by others whose judgement we do
value and whose agreement we do seek (Heysse 1998, pp. 424–427).
In other words, there is no predicting the source of corrective remarks
that we will ﬁnd unable to ignore as believers of p.
These three aspects of the normativity of belief apply to the beliefs of sup-
porters granting power to a political agent and so clarify the normativity of
power. ‘Belief’ is a normative notion in so far as beliefs are vulnerable to
objections or corrective remarks. Even in the absence of an epistemological
theory of true belief, the evaluation of a belief and of reasons justifying a
belief is not limited to the believers themselves. To the extent that power
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depends on these beliefs, power absorbs the normativity of belief. In particular,
power becomes infected by the vulnerability to objections characteristic of
belief and shares its subsequently provisional character. Moreover, convincing
objections can come from anywhere, also from parties who are (for religious,
ethnic, ideological or other reasons) ofﬁcially excluded from political debate.
In politics people who, ostensibly, are (thought) not (to be) involved, may
formulate objections undermining the beliefs from which power derives.
As a result, we do not need criteria for genuine beliefs in order to uphold
the distinction between power and (structural) violence. It sufﬁces to refer to
actual historical cases where victims of structural violence have engaged in
self-reﬂection (such as that which preceded the struggle against colonization).
During this process of self-reﬂection, subjects turn to asking about the sources
of the ‘beliefs’ justifying the existing power structure and may arrive at certain
conclusions about the beliefs’ causal history (for instance that the sole sources
of justiﬁcation of the power structure are those who beneﬁt from it). By virtue
of the involuntariness of belief, this causal history constitutes a corrective
remark that merely by becoming known undermines the beliefs in question.
Such critical self-reﬂection may be inspired from the outside. However, only
the subjects’ own conclusion about their beliefs is decisive; the distinction
between power and violence does not require criteria of genuine belief
(Williams 2002, pp. 227–229).
In the appropriate circumstances, a political agent, because of her desire for
power, has no other option but to respond to corrective remarks about beliefs
that have come from unexpected sources. Even in the absence of theoretical
standards of truth or genuine belief, power itself, by virtue of its dependence on
belief, introduces inﬂuences that break open the political relation. Consequently,
we must adjust our picture of that relation once again. Even if we restrict the
political relation to political agents, the subjects of coercive power and the sup-
porters who create power through recognition, we cannot deny the inﬂuence of
‘outsiders’ who by their remarks succeed in affecting that recognition. (Which
explains why those holding power are tempted to block communication with
‘outsiders’). Precisely this inﬂuence of ‘outsiders’ indicates that politically
effective judgement is not merely contingent on the attitudes of those involved
in the political relation (political agents, subjects and supporters).
That the normativity under discussion in this section is internal to power
itself is revealed by another aspect of the folk-psychological notion of belief:
‘although the most straightforward, simple and elementary expression of a
belief […] is an assertion, the assertion of p is neither a necessary nor [….] a
sufﬁcient condition of having the belief that p’ (Williams 1973, p. 148); speak-
ers may be insincere or unforthcoming in expressing their beliefs. Talk of
beliefs aiming at truth does not imply that the speaker intends to speak the
truth. Truth is attributed by a listener deciding whether to believe what the
speaker is saying. Whether the speaker wants to speak the truth is a question
that often cannot be answered for lack of information.16 Pointing to the
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normativity introduced into politics by beliefs aiming at truth is not to imagine
all political assertions to be truthful. It is not to forget that politics consists of
a struggle for power during which conﬂicts of interest are contested. The predi-
cate ‘is true’ crops up the moment this struggle is fought using arguments to
induce beliefs in others.
More positively, political debate offers those ambitious for power the pro-
spects of increasing and solidifying their power by providing opportunities for
convincing potential supporters. But there is a price to pay: political agents must
deliver themselves to a process that participants can accept as suitable for form-
ing beliefs. As a result, their propositions may meet with criticism, their argu-
ments with objections. In this forum, their propositions and arguments may be
rejected and their power thereby diminished. ‘The discourse of power’, in other
words, is subjected to ‘the power of discourse’ (Lefort 1978, pp. 489–490).
From the perspective of political agents interested in power, it is clearly vital
to enjoy recognition and to have the support of opinion; political agents need not
be interested in the truth of the beliefs from which their power derives, nor in
the rational standing of the arguments supporting these beliefs. But beliefs, we
now understand, are never merely a factual matter of having beliefs. Not only
will those interested in power often (at least hypocritically) have to pretend to
value truth and good arguments. Crucially, their supporters will be motivated by
beliefs and committed to their truth. (In their supporters’ opinion, if not in their
own, those in power must truly serve whatever they claim to serve). Accord-
ingly, political agents cannot be known to ignore corrective remarks completely
when they raise the question of truth or rational standing.
4. Implications: legitimacy and time
One particular normative dimension of politics derives from the fact that power
depends on support in belief. The analysis in this essay, obviously, does not
imply that justice, equality, freedom, political virtue or any other topic of
political philosophy is irrelevant for our social and political lives. Philosophers
rightly often criticize society and formulate morally interesting recommenda-
tions. Indeed, the analysis shows that philosophical considerations have their
place in the political relation, as they may inﬂuence beliefs motivating support
for political agents. If not in doubt about the truth and the political expediency
of their views, philosophers must jump into the fray and try to win over as
many people as possible, thereby changing the relations of power (Claassen
2011). An interesting example of this is Matt Sleat’s realist version of liberal-
ism that explicitly recognizes the ‘conﬂictual nature of politics’ and accepts
that liberalism is ‘a form of domination vis-à-vis those that reject it’ (Sleat
2013, p. 7, cf. Ch 6 and 7), (Rossi and Sleat 2014, sec. 3). Political theory is
now understood as consisting of political propositions (vying for power in the
sense that we seek support for them and envisage their being imposed against
opposition).
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In concluding this essay, I want to indicate very summarily how the analysis
of a normativity internal to power is connected to one of the basic questions of
political philosophy – the nature of legitimacy – as well as to a topic that has
received far less attention from political philosophers – time in politics.
There is no space left for a full account of legitimacy, but it is signiﬁcant
how much political normativity has been discovered without mentioning legiti-
macy. It is also interesting to note how the analysis of a power-based norma-
tivity provides a general framework in which to ﬁt the non-normativist account
of legitimacy recently presented by Thomas Fossen. Fossen seeks an alterna-
tive for a (moral) theory of legitimacy without reducing legitimacy to factual
acceptance of legitimacy. In his analysis, legitimacy has its ‘political point and
purpose’ when citizens take a stance towards authorities claiming an
entitlement to rule. Legitimacy ‘cannot be determined with certainty […] or
from a disengaged standpoint’; it derives from recognition by subjects during
an ongoing process of ‘stance-taking’ (Fossen 2012, p. 22). The analysis of the
creation of power by status function declarations in Section 2. helps us under-
stand legitimacy as a higher level status function that requires previously
imposed status functions (a government counts as legitimate if duly elected,
but ‘duly elected’ is itself a status function presupposing an entire system
of status functions). Understanding legitimacy as a status function explains
why those seeking power are interested in legitimacy, cf. (Beetham 1991,
pp. 56–63). For as PC expresses, ‘status functions are the vehicles of power in
society’ (Searle 1995, p. 94).
Furthermore, our account of belief in politics in Section 3 clariﬁes Fossens’
notion of attributing legitimacy. Whatever our beliefs about legitimacy in gen-
eral or about the legitimacy of those in power, they may be undermined by
corrective remarks that we ﬁnd convincing and may come from anywhere,
even from people not directly involved (people not ruled by the authorities
whose legitimacy is at stake). In other words: (1) depending on beliefs that are
vulnerable to objections, attributions of legitimacy are as provisional as beliefs.
This explains why the actual content as well as the rational standing of an
attribution of legitimacy ‘are provisionally determined in eventful, temporally
extended and embodied practices of stance-taking’ (Fossen 2012, p. 21). (2)
Despite the absence of theoretically validated criteria, issues of legitimacy are
therefore susceptible to inﬂuences that transcends the particular political
community involved. In acknowledging the impact of such objections, more-
over, we show ourselves to be aware of the ‘distinction between what is legiti-
mate and what is merely taken to be legitimate’ (Fossen 2012, p. 3).
Legitimacy is not just a matter of attributing legitimacy; it requires attributions
that survive objections and criticism. Legitimacy must be reproduced or main-
tained in provisional and therefore continuous attributions of legitimacy.
An account explaining legitimacy as the provisional result of successive
attributions of legitimacy enjoins us to make due allowance for temporality in
our account of the normativity internal to power. In the ﬁnal paragraphs of this
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essay, I can only offer some general indications as to the nature and
consequences of this temporality. In any event, by abandoning the hope for
theories in political philosophy, we abandon the uncomplicated and static
conception of political time that, as I explained in Section 1, follows from the
notion of a (stably) true theory. For the sense of normativity I have presented
here is contingent upon the fact that the recognition of status functions (and
therefore of power and legitimacy) depends on speciﬁc beliefs held at a
speciﬁc moment in time. Moreover, to accept a belief entails the acknowledge-
ment that it may be challenged at any time in the future; it entails the
acknowledgement of the inescapably open-ended character of the future of that
belief. The power-based normativity of politics therefore puts the political
agent under the unremitting requirement to ensure that the beliefs upon
which her power or legitimacy depends, survive a process that stretches
through time.
Accordingly, what speciﬁc corrective remarks are impossible to ignore for
a political agent at any given time, depends on what happens to the beliefs of
her supporters at that time (their losing faith in her political character or in the
policies she endorses). Such an account of normativity is not only more atten-
tive to the passage of time. It also accommodates other temporal aspects of
political normativity that are hard to acknowledge by political philosophers
who put their faith in stably true theories. In concluding this essay, I can only
offer a barest indication of this by sketching three quite uncontroversial
examples:
First example: political beliefs, including beliefs motivating the recognition
of power or legitimacy, are not isolated from events in political reality. Typi-
cally, political debate is sparked by events and events cast the debate in a new
light, weakening or strengthening arguments for or against beliefs. As a result
of certain political events, a political agent may have no choice but to answer
corrective remarks which challenge the beliefs that underwrite the recognition
of status functions (thereby jeopardizing power or legitimacy).
Second example: support for political agents is vulnerable to the retrospec-
tive assessment of their decisions. But the future in which a decision is evalu-
ated, is itself shaped by that decision. There is no comparing the two ‘futures’
in order to assess the decision that brought about the ‘one’ future. So recogni-
tion (and therefore power and legitimacy) may be hostage to corrective
remarks inspired by circumstances that are partly the consequence of the deci-
sions by those whose power or legitimacy is at stake.
Third example: even if discussion may in principle resume at any moment,
an issue may in practice be off the agenda and debate about it very difﬁcult to
revive. Alternatively, windows of opportunity may occasionally open up when
arguments reinforcing or undermining beliefs receive an uncommonly sympa-
thetic hearing. In this sense, the standing of beliefs motivating support for
political agents depends on opportunities in political debate.
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These admittedly hypothetical and extremely sketchy remarks not only
highlight some implications of the temporal dimensions of the normativity
internal to power. They enhance our awareness of legitimacy’s factual dimen-
sion. Even though legitimacy is not merely a matter of actually existing
recognition, it does depend on (beliefs motivating) recognition as actually
maintained in debate stretching through time. Not only is recognition provi-
sional; it rests on beliefs vulnerable to corrective remarks inspired by events
and circumstances that are partly shaped by the exercise of power itself and
dependent on ﬂeeting opportunities for advancing arguments. By contrast,
these remarks conﬁrm the normative dimension of power. There is no surprise
in the statement that power is affected by factual circumstances (the disappear-
ance of opponents, shifts in converging interests, etc.). However, in the cases
alluded to here, power is affected by circumstances by virtue of its normative
nature; the circumstances inﬂuence the standing of the beliefs and arguments
upon which power is dependent. The circumstances determine whether there
are corrective remarks that a political agent has reasons not to ignore as well
as what the content of those remarks will be.
In this sense, this temporal analysis of politics elucidates the interlacement
of normative and factual considerations that we must capture in order to make
sense of the role that ‘power’ and ‘legitimacy’ play in the political relation.
Conclusion
There is a normative dimension to politics that has not received sufﬁcient
attention in political philosophy and, in particular, in the recent debate
launched by the realist criticism of the dominant conception of political
philosophy. This political normativity is independent of our notions of practical
reason and morality as explained by a general theory as well as our under-
standing of politics as a speciﬁc practice concerned with distinctive political
virtues and goods. This political normativity derives from the fact that political
power rests on recognition and support in belief. For that fact ensures that even
political agents exclusively interested in power must act in ways that represent
them as being sensitive to normative considerations.
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Notes
1. The debate started with some papers by Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss
and with (Newey 2001). For an overview, see (Galston 2010, Philp 2012, Sleat
2013, chap. 2, Rossi and Sleat 2014). For recent stages of the debate, see
(Rossi 2012, Erman and Möller 2013, in press, Jubb and Rossi 2015,
forthcoming).
2. Just one recent example, (Estlund 2008, p. 2): ‘brute power is not a moral thing.
Like a knife, it can be used rightly or wrongly. The moral questions about the use
of knives are not much about the details of what knives are like, and the moral
questions about the uses of power are not much about the exact nature of actual
power’.
3. Corrective remarks may be appeals or guidelines for improvement or they may
point out commendable cases for instructional purposes. But for ease of exposi-
tion, corrective remarks will here be limited to negative assessments.
4. But see (Heysse 2006).
5. For examples see (Philp 2007 or Sleat 2013).
6. Williams’ realism remained incomplete and was published posthumously. So inter-
pretation is controversial. Nevertheless I do not believe this applies to what is
mentioned here. See (Sleat 2010, Bavister-Gould 2014, Hall in press).
7. However he does, at least sometimes, evoke a non-moral, almost Wittgensteinian
interpretation; it is the principle to accept if you play the language game of politics
or if you count a group within society not as enemies in war but as ‘subjects of
the state’, (Williams 2005, p. 5, See also Hall in press).
8. This applies also to the interesting analysis in (Beetham 1991).
9. In this context the Machiavellian appeal to the notion of ‘glory’ is revealing, cf.
(Geuss 2005b, Philp 2007): the ambition for glory is not (totally) unselﬁsh, but it
is not identical to an ambition for power either. For (Jubb and Rossi 2015,
forthcoming) the distinction between politics and domination is conceptual and
hence non-moral. This border on the claim that the distinction is self-evident for
all reasonable agents but it certainly does not explain why the distinction is of
interest to political agents.
10. (Erman and Möller in press, pp. 9–10): ‘To our knowledge, political realists have
given little in the way of an unambiguous characterization of [the political and
moral domains]’.
11. (Searle 1995, pp. 39–40, Searle 2006, p. 17). Comparison is with n. 2.
12. For this distinction, see (Finlay 2010, p. 334).
13. To be sure, what a political agent is concerned with is the publicly available
representations of herself, her political action and her reaction to corrective
remarks. But in many circumstances this ensures that these remarks effectively
inﬂuence her actions (a patriotic politician cannot ignore publicly available criti-
cisms of her patriotism all the time). This trend is similar to what Jon Elster has
called the civilizing force of hypocrisy, only here the force need not be civilizing
as there is no guarantee that the political agent derives her power from promoting
policies that merit being called civilized.
14. Here I am indebted to Glen Newey. Compare also (Markell 2003, pp. 39–45,
48–49, 58–59).
15. This complaint may take inspiration from some considerations of Williams intro-
ducing his ‘critical theory test’, (Williams 2002, pp. 219–232, Williams 2005,
p. 5).
16. Compare (Williams 1973, p. 148).
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